A Discussion on Goldman and Olsson’s Proposed Solutions to Swamping Problem

Abstract

This article discusses swamping problem with Goldman and Olsson's proposed solutions and brings some objections to their solutions. As an objection to the conditional probability solution of them, it is argued that since putative reliable process may not be reliable in reality and we can never be sure about the reliability of the process, we cannot count its value, if there is any, in the composite state of affairs of the reliably produced (?) true belief. Thus, the conditional probability solution cannot be a solution. Then, the solution is defended against this objection with the argument that putative reliable processes raises more reliable objections (new reliable process) than putative unreliable processes do and these new reliable processes increase the possibility of one's similar kind of future beliefs being true. In the second part it proposes objection to the second solution, value autonomization, with the question that: if someone gains a type of true belief by a reliable process which does not produce this type of true belief, still can we add the autonomous value of this reliable process to the true belief? My defense against this will be that if a type of reliable process produces an instance a type of true belief, it also produces this type of true belief.

Keywords: swamping problem; the conditional probability solution; value autonomization; reliabilism; GOLDMAN; OLSSON

            It is generally thought by epistemologists that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. Then, they initially differentiate knowledge from mere true belief. Knowledge is regarded as something which has at least three features: belief, truth and something else (usually justification) and knowledge is defined as justified true belief (JTB) with some objections such as Gettier’s objection that JTB is not adequate for knowledge in Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? (1963).

           

According to the reliabilism introduced by Goldman and Olsson “a subject S knows that p if any only if (1) p is true, (2) S believes p to be true, (3) S’s belief that p was produced through a reliable process, and (4) a suitable anti-Gettier clauses satisfied” (22) and this reliable process makes knowledge gain more value than mere true belief which is tried to be shown by two arguments of Goldman and Olsson, the conditional probability solution and value autonomization. Swamping problem is one of the criticisms of reliabilism and in this paper, I shall try to explain and discuss, to some extent, swamping problem with Goldman and Olsson’s proposed solutions, and I shall propose some objections to their solutions. As an objection to the conditional probability solution I shall propose that since putative reliable process may not be reliable in reality and we can never be sure about reliability of the process, we cannot count its value (if there is) in the composite state of affairs of the reliably produced (?) true belief and the conditional probability (solution) cannot be a solution. Then, I shall try to defend the solution with the argument that putative reliable processes raise more reliable objections (new reliable process) than putative unreliable processes do and this new reliable process increases the possibility of one’s a similar kind of future beliefs being true. My objection to the second solution, value autonomization, will be with the question that if someone gains a type of true belief by a reliable process which does not produce this type of true belief, still can we add the autonomous value of this reliable process to the true belief? My defense against this will be that if a type of reliable process produces an instance a type of true belief, it also produces this type of true belief.

           

Swamping argument can be briefed as follows:

                                                                                                                          

       (S1) Knowledge equals reliably produced true belief (simple reliabilism).

       (S2) If a given belief is true, its value will not be raised by the fact that it was reliably produced.

      (S3) Hence: knowledge is no more valuable than unreliably produced true belief. (Goldman and Olsson, 2008: 23)

            As mentioned, epistemologists suppose S3 is false, so S1, S2 (at least one) must be false. Yet, S2 seems acceptable. So S1 must be false and reliabilism is not valid. Here, Zagzebski’s espresso analogy is the most renowned one. She asserts if an espresso has a good taste, it is not a matter for its taste and raise its value that whether it is produced by a reliable machine or not, likewise, if the matter is the truth, whether it is produced by a reliable process or not, does not influence its value (13). Another example can be that Sümeyye should write a good epistemology essay and she needs some information. She has two sources Wikipedia regarded as unreliable one and Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy as reliable one. If the matter is true information for essay and Wikipedia also provide her with knowledge, it is not important to utilize the reliable or unreliable source. So, value of true belief swamps the value of source’s reliability. It is supposed that the swamping problem arising from the-extra-value-of-knowledge (EVOK) problem which is the problem of “whether reliabilism can account for the extra value of knowledge as compared with true belief” (Goldman and Olsson, 2008: 27).

           

            Goldman and Olsson propose two solutions to the EVOK problem. First is the conditional probability solution. According to this solution, the composite state of affairs of the reliably produced true belief has a certain epistemic value that would be missing if the same true belief weren’t so produced and this certain value is that increasing the probability of one’s a similar kind of future beliefs being true. So, “the probability of having more true belief (of a similar kind) in the future is greater conditional on S’s knowing that p than conditional on S’s merely truly believing that p” (27-28).  When we apply the solution to the espresso example: the probability of that reliable machine produces good espressos in the future is greater than unreliable one’s and this probability is the extra value knowledge has but mere true belief does not. However, they consult the argument with four empirical requirements: non-uniqueness, cross-temporal access, learning, and generality. We can illustrate these with Sümeyye example. By non-uniqueness, it is possible that Sümeyye will have such homework in the future. By cross-temporal access, the reliable method, using reliable sources is available when such need occurs. By learning, Sümeyye is likely to make use of the same source again on such kind of homework and by generality; this reliable source is also reliable for a similar future homework. So, the conditional probability solution cannot apply all cases if some of four requirements are not provided and it is one of the objections to this solution. Yet, I shall not discuss this objection in this paper; I shall discuss one another objection below instead.

            The other objection can be that if this assumed reliable process cannot lead us to true belief in some cases but the one assumed unreliable does, how can “increasing the possibility of one’s a similar kind of future beliefs being true” be valuable. We can state that the conditional probability solution supposes that we can know whether a process is reliable or not since in order to count it in the composite state of affairs of the (reliably produced) true belief we have to know the process is reliable. For instance, Sümeyye gains true information from Wikipedia but wrong information from reliable sources or we can give some historical examples. Until (and even during the age) Galileo (1589) dropped two balls of different masses from the Leaning Tower of Pisa, Aristotle’s false theory of gravity that objects’ descent time is relative to their masses had been taken as gospel. However, according to the age’ mindset, Aristotle was reliable and Galileo was unreliable. So, in order to gain true belief, the reliable process was the process which Aristotelian sources are used. Under the circumstances, how can we claim that it is an extra value that “the property of making it likely that one’s future beliefs of a similar kind will also be true” (Goldman and Olsson 28)? Then, since the putative reliable process may not be reliable in reality and we can never be sure about reliability of the process, we cannot count its value (if there is) in the composite state of affairs of the reliably produced (?) true belief. So, the conditional probability (solution) cannot solve the EVOK problem.

            As a response to this objection, we can talk about the probability of raising objections to putative reliable process. Let’s make clear what this means, because the putative reliable sources are taken more seriously than putative unreliable ones, objections to them are more serious and reliable than the objections to unreliable ones and this raises the possibility to reach a more reliable source. For instance, as Aristotle’s theory was considered as exactly reliable for the age, Galileo’s objection has to be thoroughly prepared, but then, if Aristotle’s theory were not thought so much reliable and, for example, this theory were only a public rumor, Galileo’s objection would not need to be carefully theorized. If Aristotle’s were not supposed so much reliable, Galileo’s might have not produced a tough objection.  So, putative reliable processes raise more reliable objections (new reliable process) than putative unreliable processes do and this new reliable process increases the possibility of one’s a similar kind of future beliefs being true. Thus, the conditional probability (solution) still can be applied to the EVOK problem.   

             

            The second solution proposed by Goldman and Olsson is value autonomization. According to the swamping argument, the matter is the true belief and if we argue that the true belief produced by a reliable process is more valuable than the mere true belief, we face the double counting problem as the reliable process derives its all value from its outcome, true belief. So, it has an instrumental value and because of that this instrumental value is also counted in the value of true belief if we add it to the value of knowledge, we count it twice. Nonetheless, value autonomization tries to solve the double counting problem by imputing an autonomous (but not fundamental) value to the process: “the value imputed to a token process is inherited from the value imputed to its type” (Goldman and Olsson, 2008: 31). In brief,

“[I]nstrumental value isn’t imputed exclusively because of a singular causal relation between a token instrumental event and a token result. There is a second kind of instrumentalism-based value inheritance. When tokens of type T1 regularly cause tokens of type T2, which has independent value, then type T1 tends to inherit (ascribed) value from type T2. Furthermore, the inherited value accruing to type T1 is also assigned or imputed to each token of T1, whether or not such a token causes a token of T2” (Goldman and Olsson, 2008: 31).

For instance, Sümeyye’s reliable philosophy source did not provide true information for this time but it frequently provides true philosophical information. Here, that it is a reliable source for a type of information (here philosophy) is the extra value raised the value of information which it provides and the source has this value autonomously from whether it is useful for this time or not.

However, if someone gains a type of true belief by a reliable process which does not produce this type of true belief; still can we add the autonomous value of this reliable process to the true belief? By referring to Goldman and Olsson T1-T2 explanation we can illustrate this question. T1 has an inherited value from type T2 whether or not causes T2. This time, type T1 causes an instance of type T3 and type T1 is a reliable process also for this instance of type T3 at this time even if it does not frequently cause type T3. In this case, does this instance of type T3 have the extra value which type T1 inherited from type T2 and unreliably produced instances of type T3 lack? It seems not. So, the instance of type T3 produced by a reliable process T1 has no greater value than instances of type T3 produced by an unreliable process (mere true belief) has.  For example, Sümeyye’s reliable philosophy source (type T1) is reliable for her this history essay (an instance of type T3), too. Yet, it does not a reliable source for the historical type of information (type T3). Does this historical information supplied by the philosophy source reliably have the autonomous extra value inherited from a different type of information that unreliably provided historical information lacks? Probably, the answer is no.

On the other hand, we may defend the value autonomization against this objection in such way that if type T1 is reliable for an instance of type T3, it is reliable for type T3. Because of this, this instance of type T3 produced by type T1 has the extra value that type T1 inherited from type T3 and the instance of type T3 produced by an unreliable process, mere true belief has not this extra value. Also, that type T1 frequently causes type T2 can frequently cause type T3 at the same time. So, if Sümeyye’s reliable philosophy source is reliable for this history essay, this means it is reliable for all history essays and this historical information supplied by the philosophy source reliably has the autonomous extra value inherited from this type of information (historical) that unreliably provided historical information lacks. Yet, this defense does not seem convincing to me.

REFERENCES

GOLDMAN, Alvin I. and OLSSON, Erik J. (2008), “Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge,” in D. Pritchard, A. Millar and A. Haddock (eds.), Epistemic Value, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

ZAGZEBSKI, Linda (2003), “The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good,” Metaphilosophy, 34, pp. 12–28.

GETTIER, E.L. (1963), “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, Analysis, 23 (6), pp. 121-123.

"ilkel" seçmenimiz üzerine geç kalmış bir not

Claude Levi-Strauss ilkel(primitive) dediğimiz insanların, ilkel değil yaban (savage) olduğunu anlatır.  Çünkü ilkel insanın birincil ihtiyaçları vardır sadece; yeme, üreme, barınma gibi. Ancak ilkel dediklerimizin- günümüzde yaşayan bazı kabilelerin ya da tarih kitaplarından okuduğumuz ilk çağ insanlarının- düşünsel, estetik vb. ihtiyaçları da olmuştur. Mesela mağaralara resimler çizmişlerdir ya da yanındaki kabile reisine önlerinden geçen kaplumbağayı soran Levi-Strauss, "kaplumbağa düşünmek için iyidir." cevabını almıştır; yemek için iyidir değil. Yaban insanı bizden ayıransa araçsal imkansızlıklarıdır. Mağaraya geyik çizen ilk çağ insanının elinde Paris'teki bir modern çağ ressamının fırçaları yoktur; dolayısıyla o geyik çok da bizim çizdiğimiz, gördüğümüz geyiğe benzemeyecektir. Özetle, ilkellik bir zihniyet meselesidir.

Bu meseleyi bana anımsatanların kim olduğuna gelirsek de: denk geldiğim renkli konuşmalarını aklım erdi ereli büyük bir hazla dinlediğim müzmin ve olmazsa olmaz siyaset dolgumuz Bahçeli ve cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimlerindeki çatı adayımız-ben flaş siyasetçi demeyi de seviyorum kendisine- İhsanoğlu.

Bildiğiniz gibi sayın Bahçeli iktidarı eleştirirken "püskevit"ten girdi, "omo"dan çıktı; "çikolata"dan girdi "tursil, persil"den çıktı. O da yetmedi, bir siyasetçi olarak oy istemeye, siyasal fayda ummaya gitmediğini iddia ettiği Diyarbakır'da "anadili Anayasa'ya koyunca karnınız doyacak mı?" diyebildi. Bunlara dayanarak ve Levi-Strauss'a referansla bir okuma yaparsak Bahçeli'ye göre seçmenin birincil ihtiyaçlarından başka bir ihtiyacı yoktu, karnı doysun yeterdi yani seçmen "ilkel"di ve dolayısıyla kendisinin seçmene vaadi de "ilkel" zihinlilerin hakettiğinden fazlası değildi:

Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimlerinde, iktisat doktoru Bahçeli'nin de içinde bulunduğu bir grup tarafından çatı adayı olarak çıkarılan profesör İhsanoğlu'nun da seçim sloganı "Ekmek için Ekmeleddin"di. Gerçi Bahçeli'nin bu konuda "Emsaleddin" Beye direkt bir desteği olmuş muydu bilmiyoruz ama yukarıdaki resme bakınca slogandan memnun kaldığını düşünebiliriz. Ancak bu sefer Bahçeli yalnız değildi ve "ilkel" seçmene hakettiğinden fazlasını vadetmeyen çatının altında ana muhalefet partisi, seçmeni makarnacı-kömürcü gören CHP de vardı ve Kılıçdaroğlu, zikrettiğimiz gibi düşünsel faaliyetleri olmayan "ilkel" seçmene anlayacağı dilden konuştu: "Adam gibi tıpış tıpış sandığa gideceksiniz, oyunuzu kullanacaksınız!"

  

of Eberle: "Consensus, Convergence, and Religiously Justified Coercion."

Eberle, Christopher J.. 2011. "Consensus, Convergence, and Religiously Justified Coercion." Public Affairs Quarterly. 25(4): 281-303

2. The Core Components of the Standard, Restrictive View

2.1 Basic Human Worth

•  “each human being has a basic worth”(282): equality, inherent dignity etc.
•  this is a function of 3 normative facts: has great (1-more excellent than others)) / equal (2) / intrinsic(3- cannot be lacked/reduced etc.) worth>human well-being

2.2 Justifying Coercion

•  basic worth>presumption against coercion
•  moral agent with aims>respect (not as a manipulated object)>reasons fr coercion
• liberals aren’t anarchists/hippies: “state coercion is sometimes justified” (283)
•  “What is necessary is not that coercion is supported by some objectively sound argument, not that coercion be justified, but that coercion must be justified to those who are coerced
• Principle of Justified Coercion (PJC): “A’s performing coercive act C against any other agent B is morally permissible only if B has, or would have on due reflection, compelling reason for A to perform C.” (284)

3. Consensus Conception of the Standard View

• Due respect for human worth>PJC
• Pluralistic liberal society with religious freedom>diversely committed population> then state coercion only justified (to public) by shared secular premises
• Secular: universal, natural, common; Religious: particular, sectarian, idiosyncratic (285)
• Principle of Religious Insufficiency (PRI): “religious reasons cannot decisively justify state coercion in a liberal polity”
• Doctrine of Religious Restraint (DRR): “citizens and public officials have a moral duty to restraint themselves from endorsing state coercion that requires a religious rationale”

4. Two Objections to the Consensus Conception

• A good formulation of the consensus conception in 8 points mentioned so far(285):

(1)  Every human being has basic worth. 


(2)  Because every human being has basic worth, state coercion is presumptively wrong. 


(3: PJC) The presumption against state coercion can be overcome only if it can be justified to each coerced human being.

            (4)  State coercion can be justified to each coerced human being in a liberal polity only by shared, shareable, or accessible reasons. 


(5)  In a liberal polity, no religious reason is shared, shareable, or accessible. 


(6: PRI) Hence, state coercion cannot be decisively justified by religious reasons.


(7) Citizens and public officials ought not support state coercion that they know to be unjustified.

(8: DRR) Hence, citizens and public officials should restrain themselves from supporting state coercion that they know requires decisive religious support.

**EBERLE: 3,4,5 are prob. while 1,2,7 are okay then 6 and 8 :(

4.1 Justifying Coercion by Shared Reasons  (4 is less than compelling)

•  286-287 example of invasion of Afghanistan: supported with non-shared, diverse spread of “sectarian” (not ecumenical) reasons and no problem of respect > (4)

4.2 Are Religious Reasons Shared, Shareable, or Accesible? (hard to believe 5 is true)

• Consensus ConceptionÞPRI (no decisive capacity of religious reason)
• EBERLE: Example of military violence in war (most brutal state coercion): generally we have a proportionality justification= P: goods>evils
• EBERLE: “(P) differs in no relevant epistemic, sociological, or moral respects from at least some religious claims, and so the differential treatment of religious and secular reasons pre-supposed by the standard view lacks a principled basis” (288)
• then why proportionality judgments> religious ones???  Even it is so complicated and requires knowing all relevant facts indeed almost impossible: then its epistemic statusL: not consistent to accept P with such a low epistemic status while L relig. *there can be an other principle irrelevantly of (P) sort of justification

5. Gaus’s Convergence Conception (against 4,5)

• a form of standard view
• as different from consensus c., despite the commonality of against coercion presumption, he has “no presumption against non-coercive state action, even when it significantly diminishes the well-being of its citizens” (289)
• each citizen should have reasons but not necessarily a shared one (convergence)
• but rejection of only one subject of L is enough to render it illegitimate (290)
•  bec of this (high) his version is stringent and far more demanding than consensus since ppl can reject L wt both shared and unshared reasons and L passes moral muster :((!
• He has no problem wt religious reasons as unshared reasons when rejecting
• Then a religious reason can play a decisive role through objection (291) but in the imposition of a law only wt a religious rationale, bec secular citizens’ have no sec reasons for L disrespectful to them
• So, “a constrained version of (PRI): although religious reasons can play a decisive role in defeating otherwise justified state coercion, religious reasons cannot play a decisive role in justifying coercion.”

6. The Convergence Conception and Religious Conviction

• Gaus: mine is a mediating position, located btw 2 extremes

6.1 Why Religious Believers Need Not Find Gaus’s Convergence Conception Repellant 

•  “implicit commitment to the equal justificatory status of religious and secular reasons” (in defeating state coercion) (292)

6.2 Positive Religious Reason to Affirm Gaus’s Convergence Conception

• “many religious believers have a deep distrust of govt” (293)
• “many believers are politically active…to protect a way of life that take to be under assault by an ever more intrusive state”

6.3 Consensus, Education, and Evolution (293-6)

• education as a form of state coercion: ie evolution X moral well-being of child
• since the taught of both creationism/evolution is coercion, there will be parents against both of these, acc to Gaus> “Removal of the topic from school curricula wins by default” (295) (HE FAVORS SILENCE)
• GAUS: liberal commitment to non-domination and sanctity of conscienceÞ for rejection religious reason is enoughÞ no problem @ integrity

6.4 Convergence and Establishment

•  Establishment Clause: state may not affirm any religious truth claim
• Koppelman: if state refrains from teaching evolution bec of religious reasons of citizens then it affirms these reasons correctness implicitly (silence case) (296)
• Considering individual conscience Gaus is more plausible than Koppelman

7. Critical Questions about the Convergence Conception

• Despite his rejection of 4, 5, Gaus still accepts PJC (297)

7.1 Is There a Presumption against Coercion Alone?

• Gaus claims that PJC distributes an asymmetrical justificatory burden: state coercion must be justified not the lack of
• Worth/respect>care for their well-being: not only a presumption against state coercion but also a presumption against non-coercive yet harmful state action (298)
•  “then state inaction that diminishes human well-being must also be presumptively wrong” (299) (ie. leave vulnerable, malign neglect) (Henry Shue, Basic Rights)
• then Gaus is wrong: lack also should be justified, any state coercion should be (300)

7.2 Can the Convergence Conception Survive Symmetry?

•  Gaus’s asymmetrical construal of PJC>ie. “silence” not needed to be justified but “creationism” is in need> “when state coercion cannot be justified, then non-coercion is justified by default, even if non-coercion is intensely controversial”
•  If we adopt a symmetrical interpretation of PJC, “none of the available policies can be justified to all, in which case each of the available policies is morally illegitimate” >not applicable because we must adopt a policy >a good reason for rejection of the symmetrical construal of PJC(301)  
• But because Gaus’s asymmetrical construal isn’t plausible, tooÞ “we hv good reason to reject (PJC) altogether. It is too demanding.”

7.3 Concluding Note on Religiously Justified Coercion after (PJC)

• “If state coercion need not be justified to each of the coerced, then it is in principle possible that state coercion can be justified by some religious rationale for which there exists no conclusive secular corroboration.” (301)
•  “If we should reject (PJC), we have no good reason to affirm (PRI). From this, further implications follow: if we have no good reason to affirm (PRI), then we also have no good reason to affirm (DRR).”(302)
• “a coercive measure that requires a religious rationale need not be morally defective in any respect.” (302)